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Transparency and Efficiency to Yes: Support of the Application of Principled Evaluative
Mediation In Property Holdout Situations
Dennis A. Durkin, Jr.*
Introduction
Holdout property owners: who are they and what are their interests? The answer
to this, of course, is relative to which side defines the term, and will be more fully
analyzed throughout this Comment. Most fundamentally, however, holdout situations
occur when existing landowners resist selling during “property assemblages” of multiple
properties by either private developers or the government that occur for the purpose of a
larger development. 1 As a result of this refusal to sell, one frequent perception of
holdouts is that their goal is to either “seek increased compensation” for their properties
or to simply resist “new development in the area.”2 From the developer’s perspective,
these holdouts boil down to opportunistic property owners’ seeking to capitalize on the
fact that a developer’s inability to acquire any one property can effectively halt the entire
development.3 Scholars have argued that this opportunistic gaming of circumstances, at
times, prevents “socially desirable” transfers from occurring.4
On the other hand, from the property owner’s perspective, he is often refusing to
sell for a variety of non-monetary reasons, such as sentimental attachment to his home.5

* J.D. Candidate, 2016, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., magna cum laude, Fairfield University.
Special thanks to Professor Angela Carmella for her guidance throughout the writing of this Comment.
1
Makowski v. Mayor of Balt., 94 A.3d 91, 101–02 (Md. 2014) (citing Mayor of Balt. City v. Valsamaki,
916 A.2d 324 (Md. 2007)).
2
Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 495–96 (2005).
3
Valsamaki, 916 A.2d at 345 n.18.
4
Daniel B. Kelly, The "Public Use" Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale Based on Secret
Purchases and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 19 (2006) (referencing existing owners who
become aware of a larger project that requires their respective property and who subsequently hold out for
“inflated prices”).
5
Lucas J. Asper, The Fair Market Value Method of Property Valuation in Eminent Domain: "Just
Compensation" or Just Barely Compensating?, 58 S.C. L. REV. 489, 491 (2007) (arguing that, “Subjective
value in the home results from the personal dignity and social status that accompany homeownership, as
well as the sentimental value an individual places on the home and surrounding land.”). See also Brian
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For instance, in a 2006 publicized episode illustrating the combination of both financial
and non-financial rationale for refusing to sell to a large development, Vera Coking
refused a $2 million offer from Donald Trump to purchase her Atlantic City property; in
July 2014, this property had an auction reserve price of $199,000. 6 Ms. Coking’s
grandson has stated that Ms. Coking does not regret the decision, because she did not
view any of the offers as “reasonable”: “a few million dollars may sound like a lot, but
it’s not for the place she loved.”7
As an additional example of the non-monetary rationale for refusing to sell to a
large development, the story of Edith Macefield, who was the alleged inspiration for the
film UP, proves illustrative.8 Although her house later sold for $310,000 in March of
2014, Ms. Macefield previously refused a $1 million offer from developers seeking to
build a mall in Seattle, Washington.9 Ms. Macefield stated that she did not wish to make
a grand statement by standing up to a large development, but rather, had strong
sentimental attachment to the property.10

Angelo Lee, Just Undercompensation: The Idiosyncratic Premium in Eminent Domain, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 593, 595 (2013) (noting that, “[T]he owner of a house may have great sentimental attachment to the
property because of happy memories of watching her children grow up there, but the market neither knows
nor cares about her memories, so their value to her is not reflected in the property's market price. As a
result, there is a substantial gap--a “subjective premium”--between the compensation that owners receive
when they are paid the market value of their property and the substantially higher value that the owners
themselves actually place on that property.”).
6
Matt A.V. Chaban, A Homeowner’s Refusal To Cash Out In a Gambling Town Proves Costly, N.Y. TIMES,
July 19, 2014, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/22/nyregion/a-homeowner-whorefused-to-cash-out-in-a-gambling-town-may-have-missed-her-chance.html.
7
Id.
8
Dominic Kelly, The Story of The Woman Who Turned Down $1 Million For Her Historic Seattle Home,
OPPOSING VIEWS (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.opposingviews.com/i/society/story-woman-who-turneddown-1-million-her-historic-seattle-home.
9
Id.
10
Id. (quoting Ms. Macefield as stating: “Where would I go? I don’t have any family and this is my home.
My mother died here, on this very couch. I came back to America from England to take care of her. She
made me promise I would let her die at home and not in some facility, and I kept that promise. And this is
where I want to die. Right in my own home. On this couch.”).
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Thus, this Comment will analyze the competing and divergent ways in which
holdouts and developers perceive each other. Part II of the Comment discusses the case
history of the eminent domain clause,11 starting with an analysis of the seminal cases in
this area and culminating in a discussion of the most recent decisions from both state
courts and the Supreme Court. 12 This section additionally analogizes the holdouts in
eminent domain proceedings for real property to those holdouts refusing to release
covenants, through analysis of Rick v. West.13 Part III then examines and evaluates the
various, recommended methods to circumvent or resolve a holdout situation, such as
“secret buying agents” 14 and “land assembly districts.” 15 Part IV then proposes an
additional, possible solution to the holdout problem as an alternative to eminent domain:
alternative dispute resolution. It first surveys both the evaluative and transformative
mediation models. This section then ultimately espouses that alternate dispute resolution,
in the form of evaluative mediation that implements a Getting to Yes 16 principled
negotiating framework, represents a transparent and efficient avenue to solutions for both
the developer and the holdout property owner.
II. History of Holdouts in Eminent Domain Proceedings
A. Real Property Holdouts
Scholars have observed that the Supreme Court addressed the “connection
between eminent domain and the holdout problem” in its very first decision involving the

U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that “No person shall…be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”).
12
See infra Part II.
13
Rick v. West, 228 N.Y.S.2d 195 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962).
14
Kelly, supra note 4, at 19.
15
Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1465, 1469–70 (2008).
16
ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN
(Bruce M. Patton ed., 1981).
11
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federal government’s implementation of its eminent domain power. 17 The Supreme
Court’s subsequent decisions in this area, up until Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,18
“signaled that almost any governmental taking, including a taking involving a private
transfer, would qualify as a legitimate public use.”19
After Midkiff, the Supreme Court did not decide a “major public use case” for
nearly twenty years.20 This occurred in the Kelo v. City of New London decision.21 In
Kelo, nine owners of fifteen properties, including Susette Kelo, refused to sell to a
development corporation 22 that envisioned a plan to replace the homes with privately
owned office buildings and a hotel in order to capitalize on a new research facility for a
large pharmaceutical company.23 After having successfully negotiated with the majority
of property owners within the planned development, city officials in New London argued
that the condemnations were justifiable because of the extended condition of the city as a
“depressed municipality.”24 In a split decision, the Court held the transfer of property
from one private owner to another in the interest of economic development as a
legitimate “public use.” 25 Justice O’Connor’s dissent vigorously argued that this was
much too expansive and that “all private property is now vulnerable to being taken and
transferred to another private owner, so long as it might be upgraded.”26

17

Kelly, supra note 4, at 10 (citing Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875)).
Kelly, supra note 4, at 10 (citing Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 230–31 (1984)).
19
Kelly, supra note 4, at 10 (citing Mark C. Landry, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain-A
Requiem, 60 TUL. L. REV. 419, 430 (1985)).
20
Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument for Banning
Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 491, 516 (2006).
21
Id. (citing Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 470 (2005)).
22
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494–95.
23
Id. at 474.
24
Id. at 504. The New London legislature characterized the city as a “depressed municipality” because of
its “ailing economy.” Id. At 469.
25
Id. at 484–486.
26
Id. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that “Under the banner of economic development, all
private property is now vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another private owner, so long as it
18

4

In the immediate aftermath of Kelo, Ohio was the first state to confront the issue
of “economic redevelopment takings.”27 In the case of Norwood v. Horney, the Supreme
Court of Ohio refused to “extend state law to the extent allowed by Kelo.”28 Norwood
dealt with a situation where a developer was predominantly able to have property owners
within a potential development sell their property voluntarily, but a small minority
refused to do so. 29 In its ruling, the court emphasized the importance of individual
property rights, which are thought “to be derived fundamentally from a higher authority
and natural law,” and are “so sacred that they could not be entrusted lightly to ‘the
uncertain virtue of those who govern.’”30
In this case, a city sought to acquire property from existing owners and transfer it
to another private entity as a part of an “urban renewal plan” for a “deteriorating area.”31
The court declined to allow such a transfer through eminent domain, noting that “judicial
review of the taking is paramount” when the government seeks to seize private property
and transfer it to another private entity.32 The court here observed that the commingling
of the private and public interests in such cases creates the possibility that the
government’s decision to impose eminent domain “may be influenced by the financial
gains that would flow to it or to the private entity because of the taking.”33

might be upgraded—i.e., given to an owner who will use it in a way that the legislature deems more
beneficial to the public—in the process.”).
27
Erik Stock, "We Were All Born on It. And Some of Us Was Killed on It": Adopting A Transformative
Model in Eminent Domain Mediation, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 687, 691 (2008) (citing Ian Urbina,
Ohio Supreme Court Rejects Taking of Homes for Project, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2006, at A18).
28
Stock, supra note 27, at 691 (citing Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1128 (Ohio 2006)).
29
Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1124–25.
30
Id. at 1128 (citing Parham v. Justices of Decatur Cty. Inferior Court, 9 Ga. 341, 348 (Ga. 1851)).
31
Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1115.
32
Id. at 1139.
33
Id. at 1140.
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An additional case that serves to exemplify the use of eminent domain in holdout
situations is a 2010 New York Court of Appeals ruling regarding Columbia University’s
acquisition of land to expand its campus.34 The court in Matter of Kaur v. New York
State Urban Dev. Corp. allowed Columbia to effectuate the taking of 17 acres for a
satellite campus in West Harlem, New York.

35

The holdouts challenging the

condemnation were several business owners within the zone of the potential development
who contended that the blight findings that allowed the taking were illegitimate and “only
serve[] the private interests of Columbia.”36 The court, however, reasoned that, since an
earlier state decision held that the Brooklyn Nets basketball arena served a “public
purpose,” then the educational promotion of Columbia University, although private, was
also authorized as serving an equal, if not greater, “public purpose.” 37 The court
favorably cited the anticipated, additional benefits of the campus in Harlem, including the
development of two acres of park-like space, a stimulus to job growth in the local area
through the anticipated hiring of 14,000 people for the construction site area, and
upgrades to the overall transit infrastructure in Harlem.38 Scholarly interpretation of this
decision argues that the standards for review and deference that the decision of the Court
of Appeals of New York gave preserve the “tradition of broad eminent domain power in
New York by limiting the judiciary’s power to invalidate state condemnations.”39
Makowski v. Mayor and City of Baltimore provides an additional, even more
recent example of the potential adverse outcomes that complete litigation can bring for a
34

Kaur v. New York State Urb. Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010).
Id. at 724.
36
Id. at 730.
37
Id. at 734 (citing Develop Don't Destroy (Brooklyn) v. Urb. Dev. Corp., 874 N.Y.S.2d 414 (N.Y. App.
Div., 1st Dep’t. 2009)).
38
Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 729.
39
Matthew Pickel, Standing Pat in A Post-Kelo World: Preservation of Broad Eminent Domain Power in
Kaur v. New York State Development Corp., 52 B.C. L. REV. 257, 259 (2011).
35
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holdout in a condemnation proceeding.40 In this case, the city of Baltimore sought to
immediately take possession of an existing property owner’s office building. 41 In
recounting the facts that the trial level found, the Court of Appeals of Maryland drew
attention to the history of the East Baltimore neighborhood that was the subject of the
proceeding. 42

In particular, the court noted the neighborhood’s historic loss of

manufacturing jobs, dating as far back as the 1950s and continuing the economic decline
into the 1990s.43 This continued loss in jobs carried with it corresponding, deleterious
impacts to the community, including substantial crime rates and population decreases,
which collectively forced the neighborhood’s property values precipitously down and
produced the image of East Baltimore as a “proverbial ghost town.”44
As an initial effort to ameliorate these problems, Baltimore attempted to restore
buildings within this zone on an individual basis.45 These efforts, however, did not work
to effectively combat the “urban decay.”46 As a result of these ineffective initial efforts,
the city refocused its efforts of rehabilitating the neighborhood to a more “comprehensive”
plan, which aimed to achieve “massive revitalization.” 47

This plan focused on

redeveloping eighty-eight acres near Johns Hopkins University Medical Center through
the construction of buildings for such things as biotechnology research and senior
housing.48

40

Makowski v. Mayor of Balt., 94 A.3d 91 (Md. 2014).
Id. at 92–94.
42
Id. at 94–95.
43
Id. at 94.
44
Id. at 95.
45
Id. at 94–95.
46
Makowski, 94 A.3d at 95.
47
Id.
48
Id.
41
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Before delving into the ultimate ruling in Makowski, it is sensible to first examine
the cases to which the court cites in support of its ultimate ruling on this holdout
situation: Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City v. Valsamaki49 and Sapero v. Mayor &
City Council of Baltimore.50 Valsamaki involved a case concerning Baltimore’s attempt
to use quick-take condemnation.51 The court held that the city must establish the reasons
that require it to possess a respective property immediately. 52 The court additionally
stood for the proposition that an impasse in negotiations for a property as part of a
development does not allow for quick-take condemnation, since regular condemnation
that affords “procedural due process protections” is still available in that event. 53
Furthermore, the court also examined the definition of a holdout and indicated that a
failure to show the presence of a holdout situation in conjunction with the failure to show
immediate necessity for possession would defeat a quick-take claim.54
The Maryland Court of Appeals, two months after its decision in Valsamaki,
again examined the idea of the holdout in a quick-title action in Sapero. 55 As in
Valsamaki, the court in Sapero noted that there was potential for permitting a quick-take
condemnation in the event of necessity, but held that the facts of the case, which
demonstrated proposals that the city had received to redevelop the land, amongst other
things, did not establish such necessity.56 Sapero additionally noted that the city’s lack of
necessity manifested itself through its decision to stall continuing with condemnation

49

Mayor and City Council of Balt. City v. Valsamaki, 916 A.2d 324 (Md. 2007)
Sapero v. Mayor and City Council of Balt., 920 A.2d 1061 (Md. 2007).
51
Valsamaki, 916 A.2d at 326. Quick-take condemnation allows a municipality to obtain “immediate
possession and immediate title to a particular property.” Id. at 327.
52
Id. at 324.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 345 n.18.
55
Makowski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 94 A.3d 91, 104 (Md. 2014).
56
Sapero v. Mayor of Balt., 920 A.2d 1061 (Md. 2007).
50
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proceedings for over a year and instead going forward with the quick-take action that
effectively “curtailed the property owner’s ability to present a defense.”57
Applying the same standards espoused in both Valsamaki and Sapero, the court
in Makowski held that the presence of a holdout in this case warranted the use of quicktake condemnation.58 The court observed that the property owner was indeed a holdout
who made immediate possession necessary because the owner at issue was the only one
in a block of over one hundred parcels of land who refused to sell, and his refusal
obstructed the broader “urban renewal plan.”59 The court proceeded to declare that the
existing owner “retained leverage to hold a hammer over the City in order to gain
financial advantage.”60 As support for its assertion, the court noted that governments
seeking to develop public projects suffer from unequal bargaining power as a result of
public knowledge of the attempted acquisition of certain properties.61
B. Residential Covenant Holdouts
While the previous discussion focused primarily on cases of real property
holdouts, the concept of holdouts extends beyond refusing to sell real property to refusing
to release residential covenants.62 For instance, in the case of Rick v. West, the plaintiffs
sought to force the defendant to release a covenant that restricted the respective land to
single family dwelling status so that the plaintiffs could build a hospital. 63 After the

57

Id. at 1076.
Makowski, 94 A.3d at 102.
59
Id. at 106 (citing Steve P. Calandrillo, Eminent Domain Economics: Should “Just Compensation” Be
Abolished, and Would “Takings Insurance” Work Instead?, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 451, 468–69 (2003)).
60
Makowski, 94 A.3d at 106.
61
Id. at 105.
62
Rick v. West, 228 N.Y.S.2d 195 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962).
63
Id. at 196.
58
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defendant refused, the court held that a covenant that provides a real benefit to the person
seeking to use it is enforceable.64
In so ruling, Rick v. West noted that the plaintiffs’ predecessor in interest was free
to decide that, as an “inducement to purchasers,” he would create the residential
covenants. 65 The court continued to assert that, since the defendant had established
reliance on these covenants, the covenants would continue to have effect because “it is
not a question of balancing equities or equating the advantages of a hospital on this site
with the effect it would have on defendant’s property.”66 There is, however, a “reverse
damages” scenario where “restrictive covenants should not be enforced unless the parties
who seek enforcement pay compensation to the parties who maintain that changed
conditions have rendered the restrictions unenforceable.”67 In addition, a current New
York statute effectively renders unenforceable “non-substantial” restrictions on the use of
land.68
The situation in Rick v. West is, in a way, analogous to the large developer who
seeks to take the land of an existing owner to put it to a supposedly better use for the
public. 69 The court in Rick v. West held that such a consideration of the competing
equities to determine the supposed best societal use was not warranted.70 So, the question
then becomes, what techniques are there to confront the “holdout” in either the real
property or residential covenant context?71
III. Comparative Survey and Analysis of Proffered Solutions
64

Id. at 201.
Id. at 200.
66
Id.
67
JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 933 n.1 (8th ed. 2014).
68
Id. at 934 n.2 (citing N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. § 951).
69
See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 494 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
70
Rick, 228 N.Y.S.2d at 200.
71
See infra Part III.
65
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A. Secret Purchasing Agents
One proposed alternative to eminent domain for confronting a real property holdout
situation is the use of secret purchasing agents.72 This proposal makes the observation
that the government customarily must make use of its eminent domain power to avoid a
holdout situation.73 The proposal observes, however, that private parties can circumvent
the use of eminent domain through the use of undisclosed agents, which can make “the
use of eminent domain for private parties unnecessary and indeed undesirable.”74
Daniel Kelly, an advocate of this solution, notes that secret purchasing agents, as seen
in the situation of a private party’s seeking to purchase the properties on a development
plan, derive their foundational legitimacy from agency law.75 For agency law purposes
in this area, the developer acts as the principal and authorizes the secret purchaser to act
as an agent to deal with the third party existing owner. 76

The way in which these

purchases occur is through a “double-blind acquisition system,” where neither the
existing owner nor the buying agent is aware of the larger development that would
require the purchase of the property.77 This would potentially address a central issue of
the holdout problem: differentiating between those existing owners who are refusing to
sell in order to achieve an inflated price versus those who are not. 78 Since purely
governmental use of eminent domain is “subject to democratic deliberation” and thus

72

Kelly, supra note 4, at 19.
Id. at 1.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 21–22.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 20–21.
78
Kelly, supra note 4, at 24.
73
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becomes public knowledge, however, sovereign use of secret buying agents to forego
eminent domain proceedings generally does not occur.79
This proposed solution ultimately seeks to prevent “socially undesirable” transfers of
land that might otherwise occur in certain circumstances where eminent domain is used
to transfer land to private parties.80 These “inefficient transfers” occur because courts
have no way of understanding an owner’s subjective value and instead rely on an
objective metric: fair market value.81 This sometimes “socially undesirable” outcome,
Kelly observes, also occurs in situations where “properties in a purportedly blighted
neighborhood are valued more highly by the existing owners than by the assembler.”82
There are notable examples of large-scale implementations of secret purchasing
agents. 83 For instance, Harvard University, in an attempt to circumvent a potential
holdout issue involving an existing property owner’s seeking an inflated price, used
secret purchasing agents to purchase multiple parcels of land at a total cost of $88
million.84 Likewise, Disney also used these agents to amass over one thousand acres of
land for its theme parks. 85 Disney primarily took advantage of the secret purchasing
agents to “overcome potential strategic behavior among sellers.”86
While these instances certainly provide illustrations of the potential efficacy of secret
purchasing agents, there are also countervailing risks associated with the mechanism.87

79

Id. at 1.
Id. at 25.
81
Id. at 6–7.
82
Id. at 58.
83
Id. at 6.
84
Kelly, supra note 4, at 6.
85
Id. (citing Mark Andrews, Disney Assembled Cast of Buyers To Amass Land Stage for Kingdom,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 30, 1993, at K-2).
86
Kelly, supra note 4, at 22–23 (citing Tim O'Reiley, Playing Secret Agent for Mickey Mouse, LEGAL
TIMES, Jan. 10, 1994, at 2).
87
Kelly, supra note 4, at 41–49.
80
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These risks include: (1) foregoing positive externalities; (2) long durations of assembly
and the possibility of collusion; and (3) distrust in the system.88 The use of purchasing
agents will potentially fail to overcome disincentives to development in instances where
the societal benefit is greater than the value of the properties of the existing owners, but
where the private benefit is lower than the value of those properties.89 In these cases, the
private party will not receive sufficient inducement to proceed with the development—
even with secret purchasing agents—and a project that would have a net societal benefit
will not take place.90
In addition, the use of secret purchasing agents carries with it an elongated bargaining
process and the threat of collusion.91 For example, the use of secret purchasing agents is
often a time-intensive process because it requires bargaining with each existing owner,
whereas eminent domain allows for relatively instantaneous acquisitions. 92

While

eminent domain still might require years of litigation,93 its use is potentially preferable to
secret purchasing agents where the development necessitates expedience.94 Furthermore,
there exists a possibility of collusion in the process between the agent and the existing
owner where the agent, if cognizant of the larger development, could either inform the
owner of the development or increase the price offer for a “kickback.”95

88

Id.
Id. at 42.
90
Kelly, supra note 4, at 42.
91
Id. at 45–47.
92
Id. at 45 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 40–42 (2d ed. 1977); Richard A.
Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owners: One More Salute to Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. &
ECON. 553, 572 (1993); Thomas Merrill, Rent Seeking and the Compensation Principle, 80 NW. U. L. REV.
1561, 1570 (1986) (book review)).
93
Kelly, supra note 4, at 45.
94
Id. at 46.
95
Id. at 46–47.
89
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Moreover, there exists the issue of creating general distrust in the system when
developers administer secret purchasing agents.96 Since use of these agents is contrary to
normal “full disclosure” negotiation, the practice has the potential to engender the
perception of the developer as “deceptive.” 97 In fact, when the owners discover the
hidden developer, the negotiations often fail.98 Existing owners who find out that they
have dealt with secret agents may subsequently lose their trust in future property
transactions.99 This breakdown in trust can ultimately compel the developer to attempt to
make costly amends with the community, such as where Harvard—in response to public
censure of their use of secret purchasing agents—paid the government voluntarily. 100
Furthermore, even those who have not directly dealt with secret purchasing agents but
become aware of their general existence may take “wasteful precautions” to determine
whether a buyer is a secret purchasing agent.101
B. Land Assembly Districts
Another proposed alternative to eminent domain for dealing with the holdout issue is
known as the “land assembly district” (“LAD”).102 This solution aims to provide a way
in which property assemblages can occur “without harming the poor and powerless,”
which is the type of harm that advocates of the proposal believe eminent domain can do
in certain instances. 103 The advocates of this mechanism note that holdouts pose the

96

Kelly, supra note 4, at 47–49.
Id. at 47.
98
Heller & Hills, supra note 15, at 1468.
99
Kelly, supra note 4, at 47.
100
Id. at 47–48 (citing See Marcella Bombardieri, Town Tensions Thawing as Harvard Earns Allston's
Trust: University Wins Plaudits with Housing Support, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 4, 2003, at B3).
101
Kelly, supra note 4, at 48.
102
Heller & Hills, supra note 15, at 1468.
103
Id. at 1467.
97
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problem of “underassembly” in private property transactions.104 This issue occurs where
a developer values a parcel of a desired assembly higher than the individual owner of that
parcel contained within that assembly, but that owner nevertheless strategically seeks a
higher price thereby diminishing the interest of the developer to assemble the properties
at all.105
While the government has the power of eminent domain to deal with this issue,
scholars note that eminent domain proceedings can result in “confiscatory
condemnations” 106 and often do not compensate the owner with any “subjective
surplus.” 107

The proposal seeks to have the law “retrofit a community with a

condominium-like structure.”108 The LAD formation and approval would be subject to a
process “substantially parallel to those involved in existing redevelopment and
condemnation procedures,” but the approving commission would need to “certify that a
LAD is necessary to overcome the problem of excess fragmentation.”109 This structure
would place a community into a district that would require a majority vote to approve the
sale of the district to a “developer or municipality seeking to consolidate the land into a
single parcel.” 110 Scholars contend that this would circumvent the holdout situation
because the owners would be subject to a “collective voting procedure.”111
While this proposal certainly has the potential to mitigate the holdout problem, it too
brings corresponding concerns.

For instance, there exists the risk of “majoritarian

104

Id. at 1468 (citing Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 639, 673–74 (1998)).
105
Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907, 927–28 (2004).
106
Heller & Hills, supra note 15, at 1527.
107
Id. at 1468.
108
Id. at 1469.
109
Id. at 1489.
110
Id. at 1469.
111
Id. at 1469–70.
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tyranny” due to the voting schematic of the proposal that requires a majority decision.112
This structure threatens minority property owners, as the majority may “enact rules solely
benefiting itself at the expense of a minority for no better reason than that the majority
can hold together a coalition of the selfish.”113 Additionally, the majority may vote for a
given assembly when other property owners within it would not do so.114 The constituent
elements of the district’s majority may additionally be corporate entities, such as real
estate investment funds, which may by their nature perceive the district as a strict
investment endeavor and fail to account for the subjective valuation of any individual
property. 115

Furthermore, those with “transient” interests within the district could

potentially “gang up on owners with deep connections to their parcels.”116 Thus, while
LADs offer a democratic mechanism to confront the holdout issue in the real property
setting as an alternative to eminent domain, it may run the risk of failing to adequately
protect the interests of the minority within the district.117
Each of the proposed solutions above offers theoretically attractive alternatives to the
use of eminent domain for dealing with the holdout situation. Without more widespread
acceptance of secret purchasing agents and in the absence of the creation of LADs,
however, an already available alternative that has proven itself as a highly effective tool
in numerous other areas will provide a practical solution to the problem: mediation.
IV. Proposal for Mediation That Uses Principled Framework
A. Mediation Benefits
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The notion of dissuading traditional litigation is not a novel one, as both federal
judges and American Presidents have noted the potential drawbacks of proceeding to
trial.118 Abraham Lincoln, for instance, exhorted the following: “Discourage litigation.
Persuade your clients to compromise whenever you can. Point out to them how the
nominal winner is often the real loser—in fees, expenses, and waste of time.” 119
Furthermore, and more specifically for purposes of this Comment, the notion of alternate
dispute resolution in the context of eminent domain proceedings is also well established,
as the use of a form of arbitration existed as long ago as in the 1660s.120
An additional form of alternate dispute resolution used in eminent domain
proceedings, mediation, consists of an independent mediator engaging with the
government and the existing owner in order to have both parties come to terms with an
agreement that both sides find suitable.121 The mediation session is dependent on the will
of the parties and can occur at any stage that the parties reach an agreement to do so.122
In this circumstance, the mediator functions to “facilitate communication between the
parties, identify their respective interests, and, hopefully, help them resolve the issues on
terms with which both can live.”123 At the mediation session, both parties, with legal
representation, join the mediator.124 The format of the mediation is subject to tailoring
and variation to fit the needs of the parties.125 The process of the mediation consists first
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of a joint session with the parties and mediator together.126 Then, the mediator conducts
separate caucuses with each party.127 At these caucuses, the mediator separately conveys
offers between the parties through “shuttle diplomacy.”128 Ultimately, the goal is to have
the mediator join the parties again to write and sign a settlement agreement.129
The advantages to mediation include high reports of settlement, low costs,
increased confidentiality, and a greater degree of control. 130

Settlement rates for

mediation in general come in at approximately 80%, with the settlement rate for eminent
domain mediations tracking closely to that figure, albeit with a small sample size of
reported settlements.131 For instance, this sample consists of a mediator in Tennessee
who has conducted eminent domain mediations and approximates the settlement rate of
his cases at around 80%.132
Furthermore, mediation foregoes the costs associated with litigation, including the
potentially sizeable expenses of “pretrial attorney fees and costs arising from discovery,
depositions, transcripts, motions, briefs, research, experts and witnesses.”133 The slow
nature of the litigation process further compounds these costs, which increase over
time.
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Eminent domain litigation costs additionally include “negative public

perception.” 135 In contrast, mediation is “far less expensive,” allows the cost of the
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mediator to be shared equally amongst the parties, and is generally less time
consuming.136
Moreover, mediation offers increased confidentiality, whereas litigation is often
an “extremely public process.”137 This confidentiality comes about as a result of statutes
that prohibit the admission of evidence concerning the mediation.138 Statutes also view
the information presented to the mediator as protected.139 Furthermore, the parties can
add further confidentiality protection through any agreed upon contract stipulations.140
The voluntary nature of mediation allows the parties to exert significant control
over the way in which the process occurs. 141 The parties are not obligated to follow
“court-mandated procedures” and instead have the freedom to define their own
process.142 Since the process is voluntary, the parties can reach a compromise.143 This is
in contrast to litigation, where the judgment at trial will create a “winner and loser.”144
Furthermore, the parties exert autonomy when they choose the mediator of the dispute.145
B. Examples of the Use of Mediation to Avoid Eminent Domain Proceedings
A recent example of the use of mediators to avoid eminent domain litigation is the
attempt of Vermont Gas Systems to run pipeline through various private properties.146
After failing to reach an agreement with a minority percentage of the affected property
owners for the easements, the company offered those owners the opportunity to conduct
136
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mediations with third-party mediators. 147 A spokesperson for Vermont Gas lauded
mediation as an attractive alternative to eminent domain litigation because it is “quicker
and generally cheaper.”148
Another example of the successful use of mediation to forego eminent domain
proceedings is found in Fort Smith, Arkansas. 149 The city made substantial use of
mediation in its efforts to acquire various properties “for expansion of a regional watersupply lake.”150 Before beginning the mediations, the town informed the landowners that
the city would pay for the cost of the mediator in order to “encourage participation.”151
In the group sessions of the mediations, the city made sure to inform the property owners
of the regional benefits of the project as well as the city’s intention to be fair during the
negotiations.152 The mediations were so uniformly successful that every session resulted
in settlement.153
C. Proposal for Transformative Model
One type of proposed mediation as an alternative to eminent domain proceedings
is based on the “transformative” method.154 This proposal recognizes that mediation in
general may address “problematic power imbalances inherent in any eminent domain
dispute.”155

The transformative model, along with the “facilitative” and “evaluative”
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models, is a “generally accepted mediation [model].” 156 The transformative model
consists of the least involved mediator, while the evaluative process implements the most
involved mediator of these three models.157 In the transformative process, the mediator
does not unilaterally establish the way in which the mediation will occur, but rather seeks
input from the parties as to how to organize the session.158 To foster and encourage
“engagement” between the parties, the transformative mediator makes use of
unstructured questioning without suggesting the answer beforehand.” 159 While the
mediator here is minimally involved, he will nevertheless draw attention to points in the
discussion where one party “recognizes and acknowledges the perspective of the
other.”160
The proposal for transformative mediation espouses that model specifically in the
eminent domain context because the minimal involvement of the transformative mediator
may lead to maintenance of the relationship between the parties.161 An advocate of the
proposal, Erik Stock, notes that the mediator who implements a transformative
methodology seeks “to foster opportunities for the disputants to experience empowerment
and recognition.” 162 The transformative model, Stock argues, will allow the existing
owner in an eminent domain proceeding to feel “empowerment.”163 According to Stock,
the use of the transformative model is particularly appealing in this context because
eminent domain cases frequently involve parties located in “neighborhoods lacking in
political power,” and the transformative model affords those parties an opportunity to
156
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“gain a voice in a dispute where they might otherwise have none and reconnect to the
government entity involved in the dispute.”164
Stock goes on to cite the Uniform Mediation Act as reinforcement for the
transformative model, since that Act emphasizes “self-determination” in order to create a
sense of equity and satisfaction with the mediation proceeding.165 This transformative
dynamic, according to Stock, is potentially useful because it necessitates cooperation
where there can be a large “emotional and psychic” discrepancy between the property
owner and the government in eminent domain cases.166 Furthermore, Stock contends that,
on a more macro level, the transformative model will preserve the relationship between
property owners and the government by engendering “democratic values” which the
scholar deems potentially greater than reaching a settlement. 167

Stock’s conclusion

emphasizes the process value of mediation, where if the property owner feels a sense of
“empowerment” while dealing with the government through a robust level of control in
the mediation itself, then the use of the transformative method is justified.168
D. Argument for an Evaluative Model of Mediation to Avoid Eminent Domain
Litigation
While the proposal of a transformative model certainly has appealing and
meritorious characteristics, including the process empowerment of the existing owner as
discussed supra,169 a holdout situation may call for more active involvement from the
mediator in an effort to reach a settlement. This active involvement is a chief feature of
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evaluative mediation—indeed, it consists of the highest level of mediator involvement of
the three primary mediation models. 170 Whereas a transformative mediator takes a
predominantly hands-off approach in an effort to bestow upon the parties a sense of
control over the mediation process, an evaluative mediator focuses much more on the
outcome of the mediation and “will not only encourage settlement, but will at times
propose a particular outcome for the dispute.”171
In general, an evaluative mediator “focuses on the legal rights of the parties and
evaluates the merits of each party’s claim.” 172

A mediator who implements this

methodology seeks to address the fundamental origin of the controversy. 173 While this
technique engenders a “more practical focus than in a purely facilitative mediation,” it
does not do so to neglect either side’s interests.174
A core competency of the evaluative model is the ability of the mediator to act as
an “agent of reality” for the parties. 175 The evaluative mediator acts as such when
providing objective and neutral advice.176 The mediator in this evaluative capacity seeks
to reach a settlement by overcoming “unrealistic opinions about the value of their claims”
that either party may have.177 To accomplish this end, an evaluative mediator “provides
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new information, helps parties realize the costs and risks of litigation, and points out
weaknesses and strengths of each side.”178
More specifically in the eminent domain context, an evaluative mediator provides
the parties with “opinions on any of the many issues which arise in eminent domain
matters, including the potential outcome at trial.” 179 The evaluative mediator in this
context may also candidly assess the costs and benefits of proceeding to litigate the
issue.180 During this discussion, the evaluative mediator may choose to present a “verdict
range” that incorporates the probability of potential outcomes within that realm of
possibilities.181 Since an evaluative mediator has this ability to offer opinions on the
matter, the use of an “experienced mediator with eminent domain expertise” serves to
enhance the session.182
E. Incorporating Principled Framework to Evaluative Model
This Comment proposes that a principled negotiating framework based on the
seminal book Getting to Yes183 will augment the efficacy of evaluative mediation in the
eminent domain context.

Scholars have referred to this work as the “Bible for

cooperative negotiations and generally a very useful blueprint for mediation.”184

The

main precepts of the work are: “1) separating the people from the problem, 2) focusing on
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interests not positions, 3) inventing options for mutual gain, and 4) using objective
criteria.”185
1. Separating the People from the Problem
As to the first principle of “separating the people from the problem,” the book
notes that, “The ability to see the situation as the other side sees it, as difficult as it may
be, is one of the most important skills a negotiator can possess.” 186 This ability to
analyze the situation from both sides underscores the evaluative mediator’s goal of
objective assessment of the root causes of the case.187 Furthermore, while this principle
recommends focusing on the problem itself, it does not disregard the emotions of the
parties involved and advises negotiators to “deal with the people as human beings.”188
Since emotions on the part of the potential holdouts have the tendency to run high,189 the
evaluative mediator would be prudent to heed the advice of this principle and recognize
these human emotions at the mediation session, while maintaining a simultaneous but
separate focus on the problem, as the principle suggests.
The use of this principle is highly complementary to evaluative mediation, which
emphasizes the role of the mediator as bringing objective and neutral reality to the
parties. 190 Conversely, this principle is at odds with the precepts of transformative
mediation, which does not separate the people from the problem but instead seeks to have
the parties feel empowerment over the problem.191 The use of evaluative mediation with
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the application of this principle is preferable to the transformative model in the eminent
domain context because, while it would address the emotional element192 of potentially
selling one’s property, it would not allow these emotions to create “unrealistic opinions
about the value of their claims” that would conceivably interfere with settlement.193 For
instance, in the example of Vera Coking, who turned down an offer to sell her property
for $2 million to Donald Trump only to ultimately have the property receive an auction
reserve price of approximately $1.8 million less than that offer,194 an evaluative mediator
would have acted as an “agent of reality” to make Ms. Coking aware of this potential
precipitous price decrease as well as the objective assessment of the offer at the time it
was made.195
By adhering to this principle, the evaluative mediator would also be able to avoid
the potential issue of distrust in the system related to the secret purchasing agent
proposal. 196 That proposal would effectively remove the people from the problem
through the use of undisclosed purchasing agents so as to not make an existing owner
aware of a larger development plan, but this practice is often seen as “deceptive.” 197
Indeed, property owners who come to realize that they have transacted with undisclosed
agents may suffer from a breakdown in trust in future property dealings. 198 This
“separating the people from the problem” principle seeks to accomplish just what it
claims, however: it untangles the issue at hand from emotion, but does not wholly remove
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the human component. 199 Thus, the evaluative mediator implementing this principle
would not have to rely on deception, as is the potential case with the use of secret
purchasing agents. 200

In order to achieve a positive outcome for the parties, the

evaluative mediator can still objectively assess the merits of each party’s position without
conflating the problem with emotion. 201 This would forego the potential costs to the
secret purchasing agent proposal, including the monetary costs associated with making a
financial apology to the community, as was the case with the Harvard example,202 and the
costs associated with precautionary assessments of whether a buyer is a secret purchasing
agent.203
2. Focus on Interests
As to the second principle of “focusing on interests not positions,” the book
asserts that, “a close examination of the underlying interests will reveal the existence of
many more interests that are shared or compatible than ones that are opposed.”204 This
focus on interests by the evaluative mediator would lend itself to separating those
property owners who are holding out for opportunistic reasons from those holding out for
non-monetary reasons.205 For instance, the evaluative mediator would aim to objectively
determine whether someone like Edith Macefield actually imputes a sentimental premium
on the value of a given property, is simply strategically seeking a higher price knowing
that her property is essential to the larger development scheme, or is indeed simply

199

Fisher & Ury, supra note 16, at 39.
Kelly, supra note 4, at 47.
201
Fisher & Ury, supra note 16, at 39.
202
Kelly, supra note 4, at 47–48 (citing Marcella Bombardieri, Town Tensions Thawing as Harvard Earns
Allston's Trust: University Wins Plaudits with Housing Support, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 4, 2003, at B3).
203
Kelly, supra note 4, at 48.
204
Fisher & Ury, supra note 16, at 42.
205
See supra Part I.
200

27

attempting to make some sort of grand statement against the development itself.206 As
another example, in the Columbia University expansion case, the evaluative mediator
would actively seek to establish whether the business owner holdouts in that case truly
believed the area was not blighted,207 or whether their true interest for holding out was
strategic in nature.
This is an additional and appealing, distinguishing characteristic of evaluative
mediation implementing this principle from the transformative model, since the
transformative mediator would simply focus on creating the feeling of empowerment
amongst the parties.208 While there is a strong argument that this emphasis on the process
will enable the parties to feel a greater sense of control over the mediation,209 the session
may very well conclude without an objective third party’s determining the reasoning
behind the refusal to sell, which is the precise determination that this focus on interests
promotes.210 This would ultimately better enable the evaluative mediator in the active
promotion of settlement.211
3. Inventing Options for Mutual Gain
Moreover, in reference to the third principle of “inventing options for mutual
gain”, the book notes that, “[i]n a complex situation, creative inventing is an absolute
necessity.

In any negotiation it may open doors and produce a range of potential

agreements satisfactory to each side.”212 The potential efficacy of the application of this
principle is seen in the result in Rick v. West, a case in which the construction of a
206
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hospital did not occur because of a holdout’s enforcement of a residential covenant.213
The court held that it would not conduct a balancing of the potential benefits of a hospital
with the potential burden imposed on the covenant holder if it were not enforced, but
would instead focus on whether the covenant-created reliance was an “inducement to
purchasers.”214 In a case like this, an evaluative mediator implementing this principle
would attempt to come up with a broad range of possible solutions215 that could have
produced the ostensibly favorable result of the construction of a hospital, such as possibly
giving the holder of the restrictive covenant some interested stake in the new hospital for
releasing the covenant.

In addition, the evaluative mediator could use his active

involvement in the mediation to create solutions based on the purported benefits of the
development, such as in Matter of Kaur v. New York State Urban Development Corp.,
where an evaluative mediator could potentially have based a number of creative solutions
on the litany of potential benefits of Columbia University’s expansion, such as its
creation of thousands of jobs and benefits to the local transit system and environment.216
This is another chief advantage of evaluative mediation over its transformative
counterpart, since the more active involvement of the evaluative mediator is more
conducive to the creation of different, possible solutions, as opposed to the general
passivity of the transformative mediator.217 Furthermore, the evaluative mediator could
also present the parties with a probability analysis of these outcomes if a trial is needed as
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a backdrop to any other possible, devised solutions so as to convey the possible risks
involved with each solution.218
4. Establishment of Objective Criteria
Finally, Getting to Yes encourages establishing “objective criteria” upon which to
base the negotiations.219 This criteria, the book argues, should consider “standards of
fairness, efficiency, or scientific merit.” 220

This principle complements the risk-

assessment and opinion-providing function of the evaluative mediator221 by underscoring
the need to establish an objective basis for that judgment.
One such possible criteria to assist the evaluative mediator’s creation of a “verdict
range” 222 would be the use of past holdout case results.

For instance, Kelo could

potentially provide caution to the holdout who is considering creating an impasse at
mediation, as the Supreme Court, albeit in a split decision, asserted the transfer of
property from one private owner to another in the interest of economic growth to be a
permissible “public use.”223 Similarly, Makowski illustrates another example of a case
result that the evaluative mediator could use as an objective benchmark to provide
admonition to a would-be holdout.

There, the court provided guidance as to who

constitutes a holdout and ultimately held that the refusal to sell in that case amounted to
interference with the more comprehensive “urban renewal plan” at issue and thus
warranted condemnation.224
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Conversely, the evaluative mediator could juxtapose these potential outcomes
with the result in Norwood, which held that condemnation was not warranted in a case
where a municipality attempted to obtain private property and transfer it to another
private party in order to ostensibly revitalize the city, with the court noting that this raises
the possibility of improper financial benefits to the city or to the private party to which
the property is ultimately transferred. 225 Thus, these case results could provide the
evaluative mediator with the tools necessary to establish the type of “objective criteria”
that Getting to Yes espouses.226
V. Conclusion
This Comment began with a definition of a holdout as a landowner who resists
or refuses to sell to a larger development. These holdouts are often subject to eminent
domain proceedings to effectuate the development. As discussed, various alternatives to
eminent domain exist to deal with the holdout issue, including secret purchasing agents
and land assembly districts. This Comment then advanced evaluative mediation as a
beneficial approach to dealing with holdouts due to this model’s emphasis on mediator
activity and settlement.
The proposal centered on the general appeal of mediation, including the cost and
control advantages compared to traditional litigation of eminent domain cases. More
specifically, though, this Comment argued that evaluative mediation is better-suited to
reach the needed settlements in eminent domain cases through the ability of the mediator
to actively provide evaluations of the matter, distinguished from the general passivity of a
transformative mediator.
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negotiating framework to complement and enhance this evaluative mediation. Using this
framework, the mediator will have a strong basis upon which to both conduct the process
of these potentially highly emotional holdout cases as well as to provide an independent
opinion of the case based on objective criteria.
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